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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: HOUSING PART N
-----------------------------------------------------------------x
AMSTERDAM I LLC,
Petitioner,
-againstL&T INDEX No.: 67418/18
ROSA SANTOS,
DECISION / ORDER
Respondent.
PREMISES: 2014 Amsterdam Avenue, Apt. 4S
New York, New York 10032
------------------------------------------------------------------x HON. TIMMIE ERIN ELSNER, J.H.C.
Recitation, as required by CPLR §2219(A), of the papers considered in the review of
respondent’s motion to hold the petitioner in contempt of court:
____________________________________________________________________________
Papers
Numbered
Respondent’s Order to Show Cause and Affidavit Annexed with Exhibit..... 1
Petitioner’s Affirmation and Affidavit in Opposition with Exhibits. ............ 2
Respondent’s Replying Affirmation and Affidavit......................................... 3
Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition........................................... 4
Respondent’s Memorandum of Law in Support............................................. 5
____________________________________________________________________________
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Amsterdam 1 LLC (“petitioner”) commenced this nonpayment proceeding against the
rent-stabilized, tenant of record, Rosa Santos (“respondent”), for 2014 Amsterdam Avenue, Apt. 4S,
New York, N.Y. 10032 (“premises”) at the monthly rate of $1,558.00 for April and May 2018.
Respondent appeared pro se and interposed an answer, alleging that a portion of the rent had been
paid and that petitioner failed to provide services and/or repair conditions in the premises.
The matter was initially scheduled for July 27, 2018 in Resolution Part H at which time
respondent was referred for legal representation. Counsel appeared on Oct. 28, 2018. By stipulation,
dated November 29, 2018, the parties agreed that “respondent’s attorney sent petitioner’s counsel a
list of conditions alleged to exist in the apartment earlier this month along w[ith] proposed access
dates. Respondent’s counsel is waiting on confirmation of access dates.” Ultimately, respondent’s
attorney moved to amend the answer to assert, among others, breach of warranty of habitability as
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an affirmative defense and counterclaim. The proposed amended answer, sworn to January 22,
2019, specified conditions in the premises which respondent claimed were rent impairing including,
but not limited to: mouse and roach infestation; a broken burner on the stove; and missing floor tiles.
A court-ordered HPD inspection was conducted on March 28, 2019 and eleven violations were
issued: one class “A”; eight class “B”; and two class “C”. The class “C” violations required
petitioner to “Abate the infestation consisting of roaches in the entire apartment ...” and “Abate
infestation consisting of mice in the entire apartment...” The “B” violations included “Properly
repair with similar material the broken or defective wood floor in the 4 th room from east ...” and
“Properly repair the broken or defective 2 stove burners not working in the kitchen...” The motion to
amend was granted by order, dated April 25, 2019, and the matter was refer to Part N for trial.
On May 2, 2019, the parties appeared for a pretrial conference. In addition to the
petitioner’s attorney, David Tennenbaum appeared as petitioner’s agent with authority to resolve the
parties’ claims and defenses. By so-ordered stipulation, dated May 2, 2019, the parties agreed to
the following:
1.
2.
3.

4.

6.

8.

The parties agree that $14,123.12 is owed through and
including 5/31/19.
The parties agree to an abatement of $1,013 in full
satisfaction of all warranty of habitability claims to date.
Petitioner acknowledges receipt in open court today of
DSS checks and money orders totaling $12,828.04 listed
below . . . .
Balance of $282.08 to be paid in accordance with DSS
direct vendor payments schedule but in any event on or
before 5/31/19.
*
*
*
Attached as Exhibit A is the HPD print out of outstanding
violations fated 5/1/19. Any conditions not yet repaired are
to be repaired by 5/31/19 as required by law.
*
*
*
Petitioner alleges and respondent disputes that it has completed
the majority of violations.
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By Order to Show Cause, dated June 21, 2019, respondent sought relief including, but not
limited to, issuance of an order “(i) punishing Amsterdam 1 LLC for civil contempt by fine,
imprisonment, or both for their failure to comply with the stipulation so-ordered by the Hon. Timmie
E. Elsner on May 2, 2019; (ii) awarding actual damages incurred as a result of petitioner’s failure to
comply with the orders of this Court. The respondent alleged four conditions had not been corrected
including mice and roach infestation, which HPD had categorized as “C” violation, as well as a
broken and defective floor in the 4th room and a broken stove burner. The respondent also claimed
additional conditions had occurred since the May 2, 2019 stipulation. The motion was returnable
July 2, 2019 and adjourned pursuant to a briefing schedule to July 30, 2019.
Through its attorney, petitioner submitted opposition to the order to show cause. The
affirmation of Jordan J. Tapia notes that petitioner’s agent, David Tennenbaum, was present in court
when the stipulation was entered. It claims that, as evidenced by self-certification by petitioner, all
violations have been removed save for an “administrative violation.” Paragraph 18 of the
affirmation states “Further, it should be noted that the violations that previously existed in the
Respondent’s apartment were the direct result of Respondent’s own living conditions. Petitioner has
even advised the Respondent on multiple occasions that she can request regular extermination
services and she has failed to do so.” (See Tapia Affidavit, July 16, 2019).
Petitioner’s opposition was also supported by the affidavit of David Tennenbaum. Mr.
Tennenbaum swore, under oath, that he is an agent for the petitioner and that there was no basis for
the order to show cause as “all the alleged repairs have been completed and no violations currently
appear for this unit on HPD’s website except for one administrative violation.” Mr. Tennenbaum
failed to mention that the violations had been removed through petitioner’s self-certification of
completion rather than by HPD inspection. He asserted that he was present in court when the
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stipulation of May 2, 2019 was entered and “[i]t should be noted that many of the repairs alleged
were the result of Respondent’s own living conditions. As an example, the alleged mice and roach
issue is due to Respondent’s repeated failure to keep the apartment clean.” In response, respondent
affirmed the conditions claimed in the underlying Order to Show Cause continued to exist.
As of July 30, 2019, HPD had not re-inspected the premises. Following argument of the
order to show cause, the court granted respondent’s application “to the extent of setting the matter
down for a hearing” to determine whether petitioner complied with the terms of the settlement
agreement of 5/2/19 and, if not, whether petitioner is in contempt of this court’s order. As part of
this hearing, the court may inspect the premises. In the event it does so, the results of the inspection
will become part of the record with respect to the hearing. The attorneys for the parties may arrange
for interim access for completion of repairs despite petitioner’s position that they are complete.”
The court ordered: initial access dates of August 7 and 9, 2019; an HPD inspection for August 26,
2019 to give petitioner another opportunity to insure all conditions had been addressed; and
adjourned the hearing to September11, 2019.
HEARING
On September 11, 2019, the parties appeared for a hearing relating to petitioner’s alleged
contempt. The court took judicial notice of the results of the HPD inspection of August 26, 2019
and noted that, in addition to approximately 15 new violations, three of the conditions, which were
the subject of the contempt motion, were re-issued: a “C” violation for roach infestation; a “C”
violation for mice infestation; and a “B” violation for the broken wood floor in the 4 th room from
east. The HPD inspector did not issue a violation for broken stove burners.
Petitioner continued to assert that the conditions in the premises were the result of
respondent’s poor housekeeping and lifestyle. Based on the forgoing, the court determined a visit to
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the premises was in order. Petitioner objected, in part, because respondent would have time to clean
the premises before the visit occurred. The court overruled the objection and conducted its inspection
on September 18, 2019. It placed the results of its inspection on the record on September 20, 2019.
On September 18, 2019 the court arrived at the building at approximately 3:25 p.m. and
waited approximately ten minutes for petitioner’s attorneys and/or managing agent to arrive. When
they did not appear, the court entered the building and proceeded to the premises. The building
superintendent was present. The court observed that the hallway and lobby were dirty and that
common area floors were patched with many different materials. Years of deferred maintenance
were apparent. The court was met at the premises by respondent’s attorney, an interpreter,
respondent and numerous children. The apartment was clean and neat. There was no indication that
it had been scrubbed to create a false impression for the court. No odor of cleaning fluid was present.
It was readily apparent that the linoleum covering wood floors was completely worn and improperly
patched in a way which formed a trip hazard as was evidenced by numerous violations placed by
HPD. The court refrained from inspecting other new violations placed by HPD as they were not the
subject of the hearing.
The first room entered was the kitchen. Although no new violation was placed for the
condition of the stove, the court tested the burners. The ignition for one of the four burners sparked
but did not ignite. Mouse droppings and evidence of infestation were present near the stove and sink
despite the cleanliness of the kitchen. Most disturbing were roaches freely roaming throughout the
apartment. The court observed many canisters of insecticide stored in the premises and that, despite
the daylight hour, all the lights were turned on. Roaches were crawling on the floors and walls of the
kitchen, bathroom, and bedrooms. The court observed children in the premises reacted to the roaches
nonchalantly as if they were a common aspect of day-to-day life. The premises were sparsely
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furnished in a way that did not encourage breeding or shelter for insects. Finally, the floor in the
fourth room (child’s bedroom) remained improperly patched. The linoleum was worn to the point
where the wood floor beneath was apparent (thus, the violation for “repair defective wood floor”).
After placing its findings on the record, the court suggested ways to cure the violations which
were the subject of the hearing. It adjourned the matter for witness testimony and to provide
petitioner additional time to address conditions and purge any potential contempt. The first witness
petitioner called to refute respondent’s claims was the respondent herself. On examination, the
respondent admitted that petitioner had addressed most of the issues with the floor. They also put
“poison” for roaches on the furniture throughout the kitchen, including inside the cabinets, where
food was kept on October 2, 2019 and a subsequent date, had her sign a document and left. The
treatment had no effect on the infestation.
Jorge Alejandro, the building superintendent, testified next. He stated that he is responsible
for cleaning the building and performing routine maintenance. According to Mr. Alejandro, an
exterminator visited the premises and utilized special liquid for treating the kitchen and bathroom.
He was not present during the visit but was aware the respondent provided access. He was unaware
of any long-term plan for curing the class “C” violations other than the routine sign-up for monthly
extermination and his use of a spray.
Respondent took the stand again but this time on her own behalf. She testified that the last
time the superintendent exterminated was in June 2019. In October, Mr. Alejandro replaced floors in
the premises as well as a kitchen cabinet and the bathroom ceiling. The mouse and roach infestation
continued and, if anything, were worse than ever. Respondent believed mice were entering through a
hole in the bathroom. At times, they were seen in the beds and bed sheets, events clearly disturbing
to the witness. She also testified that she awoke to find a roach in her ear one morning. Respondent
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admitted she would not allow the superintendent to enter the premises without her being present.
He always notified her prior to placing poison in the premises so she could protect the children from
exposure. The court then adjourned the case for a re-inspection to determine whether the conditions
were addressed and for submission of memorandum on a legal issue. The “C” violations for mice
and roach infestations were re-issued as was the “B” violation for a defective floor in the 4 th room.
Based upon these violations, it was clear petitioner failed to purge any potential contempt.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Civil contempt requires a determination that a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing
an unequivocal mandate was in effect; a determination “with reasonable certainty” meaning proof
by clear and convincing evidence that the contemnor disobeyed that order; that the contemnor knew
of the Court’s order, although it is not necessary that the order actually have been served upon the
party. See El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19 [2015]; see also, Matter of First Am. Tit. Ins.
Co. v Cohen, 163 AD3d 814 [2d Dept 2018]. It must also be shown that the disobedience defeats,
impairs, impedes or prejudices the rights or remedies of a party. See Board of Directors of Windsor
Owners Corp. v Platt, 148 AD3d 645 [1 st Dept], leave to appeal dismissed, 30 NY3d [2017].
In this instance, the so-ordered May 2, 2019 stipulation expressed a clear and unequivocal
mandate to correct violations. The court notes that Mr. Tennenbaum, who describes himself as a
petitioner’s agent, was present when the agreement was “so-ordered” by the court and was aware of
its terms.
Respondent has shown that petitioner failed to obey the order of the court which directed
correction of violations in the premises with respect to mouse infestation, roach infestation, and
repair of a floor in the fourth room (child’s bedroom) in the premises. Repeated violations were
issued for these conditions on March 28, 2019, August 26, 2019, and October 29, 2019. The
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existence of these violations, in and of themselves, evince prejudice to petitioner which supports a
finding of contempt. See Brown v 315 E. 69 St. Owner Corp., 11 Misc3d 1069(A)[Civ Ct, NY Co.
2006], citing, Various Tenants v N.Y.C. HPD, 153 Misc2d 221 [App Term, 1 st Dept 1992].
Petitioner’s claims that the respondent contributed to the violations by failing to keep the
premises clean are not only unsupported by the testimony of the sole witness appearing on
petitioner’s behalf who actually visited the premises, Jorge Alejandro, but also by the court’s
inspection on September 18, 2019.
The court finds petitioner not only in contempt of its order, dated May 2, 2019, but also
orders of July 30, 2019, September 11, 2019, and September 20, 2019, which directed correction of
the same conditions, two of these conditions are categorized by the City of New York as
“immediately hazardous” seriously effecting the health, safety, and welfare of those in the premises.
The court further notes that it repeatedly granted petitioner time to “purge” any contempt, even
suggesting ways to address violations in findings issued on the record on September 20, 2019.
Clearly, the court is empowered to hold petitioner, a Limited Liability Corporation in civil
contempt as the result of its failure to comply with court orders. It also finds David Tennenbaum, an
agent of petitioner, in civil contempt. “Persons not parties who have knowledge of [a court order]
may be bound by the [court order] providing they are in privity with a party, such as officers or
agents or servants of a party acting in collusion with the party.” See Matter of Rothko, 84 Misc2d
830 [Surrogate’s Ct., NY Co. 1975], modified on other grounds, 56 AD2d 499 [1st Dept], aff’d,
43 NY2d 305 [1977]; see also, McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216 [1994](finding no basis “to
absolve the individual agents of the City who performed or failed to perform the ordered acts, while
holding the abstract principal, the City, responsible and in contempt for the very same failure to
comply. The individual defendants were sufficiently aware of the prior orders...the prior contempt
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proceedings, and the unacceptable and unauthorized circumstances and conditions surrounding the
use of the EAUs. The City and the individual contemnors had adequate and sufficient notice of
decrees and the contempt proceedings against them for their individualized responsibility and
noncompliance.”). Thus, if the landlord is a corporation, “an officer...responsible for its affairs and
its disobedience may ne held liable for the corporation’s contempt.” N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. &
Dev. v B.B. Am Holding, Inc., NYLJ, June 22, 1985, p.28, col. 4 [App Term, 1 st Dept] citing,
Citibank v Anthony Lincoln-Mercury, 86 AD2d 828 [1st Dept 1982]; see also, Johnson v Atop
Roofing & Siding Corp., 135 Misc2d 746 [Civ Ct, Kings Co. 1987].
In contrast to criminal contempt, which requires greater procedural protections, “civil
contempt sanctions, or those penalties designed to compel future compliance with a court order, are
considered to be coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary
civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard.” See International Union, United
Mine Workers of America v Bagwell, 512 US 821, 114 S.Ct. 2552 [1994]. “Because civil
contempt sanctions are viewed as non-punitive and avoidable, fewer procedural protections for such
sanctions have been required.” Id. at 831; see N.Y.C. HPD v B.B. Am Holding, Inc., supra
(vacating the criminal contempt penalty against the corporation’s president because he was not
personally served with the contempt papers, but affirming the sanction for civil contempt against
him).
In this instance, respondent was not required to name or serve David Tennenbaum
individually with a copy of the order which forms a basis for the relief requested or with a copy of
the order to show cause seeking a finding of civil contempt. Mr. Tennenbaum had notice of the
court’s order of May 2, 2019 as well as the order to show cause seeking contempt penalties
including fine, imprisonment, and an award of actual damages incurred for failure to comply with
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the court’s order. By holding himself out as petitioner’s agent, the person responsible for insuring
compliance, he stands in pari delicto for purposes of civil contempt.
New York Law permits the party in contempt to purge the contempt by performing the act
required, or by undoing or reversing the acts constituting the contempt. See Matter of Silverstein v
Aldrich, 76 AD2d 911 [2d Dept 1980]; see also, Dankner v Steefel, 41 AD3d 526 [2d Dept 2007]
(court should have provided opportunity to purge contempt); Matter of Pronti v Allen, 13 AD3d
1034 [3d Dept 2004] (“contemnor generally allowed an opportunity to purge the contempt by
performing the act required...”).
In this instance both petitioner and David Tennenbaum, as its agent, have been granted
ample opportunities to purge their contempt. The court extended the time period to correct violations
on July 30, 2019, September 11, 2019, and September 20, 2019. After completion of testimony on
October 22, 2019, a final HPD inspection was ordered by the court to ascertain whether violations
were corrected. Petitioner, rather than ensuring compliance, continued with blind assertions of fault
on the respondent’s part and made no attempt to correct violations.
As set forth in New York Judiciary Law Section 774(1) which governs the length of
imprisonment following a finding of civil contempt, “where the misconduct proved consists of an
omission to perform an act or duty, which is yet in the power of the offender to perform, he shall be
imprisoned only until he has performed it...” These penalties were enacted by the legislature in
furtherance of the purpose of Civil Contempt sanctions which are designed to compel future
compliance with court orders and are considered to be coercive and avoidable through obedience.
See International Union, United Mineworkers of America v Bagwell, supra. Pursuant to New
York Judiciary Law Section 772, “Upon the return of an application to punish for contempt, the
questions which arise must be determined, as upon any other motion; and, if the determination is to
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the effect specified in section seven hundred and seventy, the order thereupon must be to the same
effect as the final order therein prescribed. Except as hereinafter provided, the offender may be
committed upon a certified copy of the order so made, without further process. . . .”
CONCLUSION
The court finds that both petitioner and its agent, David Tennenbaum, in contempt of the
Court’s order of May 2, 2019. It is undisputed that they were aware of the order, continue to disobey
that order despite multiple opportunities to comply, and that respondent has been harmed by said
disobedience. Petitioner and its agent are granted ten days from service of a copy of this order with
notice of entry to purge their contempt by curing the class “C” violations in the premises for mouse
and roach infestation, as well as the class “B” violation mandating repair of the floor in the fourth
room (child’s bedroom). Respondent is to provide access to petitioner and its agents as arranged by
her attorneys during the ten-day period set forth herein. Petitioner and David Tennenbaum are to
appear personally in court on February 5, 2020 at 9:30 a.m. with proof that the violations have been
corrected and a plan to address the infestations going forward.
This constitutes a Final Order and the date set forth herein for compliance is deemed a return
date for the motion for contempt. A default in appearance or failure to purge the order of contempt
may result in the issuance of a warrant for arrest and order of commitment as well as civil penalties.
The balance of the motion which seeks monetary damages on behalf of respondent is granted
to the extent of restoring the matter to the calendar on February 5, 2020 at 9:30 a.m. to select a
hearing date to determine the extent of damages sustained by respondent and/or the appropriate fine.
This constitutes the order and decision of the court.
Dated: New York, New York December 31, 2019__________TIMMIE ERIN ELSNER, J.H.C.
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